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CUBA PROJECT PROGRESS REPORT

4 - 11 April 1962

OPERATIONAL

1. An internal leader of the Movimiento Recuperacion Revolucionario (MRR) who was infiltrated into Cuba on 29 December 1961, and exfiltrated on 29 March 1962, said at a debriefing on 7 April that he considers only five clandestine resistance [redacted] organizations in Cuba of national importance: The Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE), Movimiento Demócrata Cristiano (MDC), Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP), Movimiento Recuperacion Revolucionario (MRR), and the 30th of November [redacted]. Only these groups have the necessary motivation and discipline to [redacted] coordination among themselves. There are a large number of other underground revolutionary units [redacted] which claim to be of national importance but which have no more than two or three dozen men at most and can be found only in the area where they were established. Most of the small [redacted] appear to have been established by self-named leaders for personal reasons, financial gain through the sale of "bonds," or for future political opportunity [redacted] when [redacted] Fidel Castro is overthrown. Although the small groups are relatively inactive, their claims to importance have attracted numerous dissidents who could be more useful if they were members of the few larger and more effective organizations. Because

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of the boundless personal ambitions of the respective leaders and the geographic dispersion of the units, ^{however,} these small groups could never be effectively merged into a centrally directed larger ~~unit~~ ^{organization.} To use them effectively we would have to try to siphon off the membership to ~~into~~ controlled groups. If this is not possible, they may serve a useful purpose by providing unwitting diversionary harassment while the larger groups work toward the major goals.

2. A unilaterally recruited senior officer of the diplomatic service of a neutralist African country has been briefed and given training in secret writing and communications to assist him in reporting on our objectives in Cuba. He is now in Havana from where he plans ~~other Cuban~~ to travel to areas of interest to us.

3. The Chief of the Intelligence Service has agreed to cooperate with us on Cuban intelligence operations. He has identified several sources aboard ships transiting Cuban ports and has arranged for their periodic briefing and debriefing.

4. The Intelligence Service has also agreed to cooperate with us in establishing case officer "centers" in and to handle Merchant Marine sources who call at Cuban ports.

5. The Madrid Station Cuban refugee debriefing center is now in operation and results of the first interrogations are ~~now~~ being reviewed

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for dissemination. The most interesting and informative refugee thus far is the brother of Amando Hart, the Cuban Minister of Education and member of the twenty-five man ORI Central Committee. The center is also collecting travel and personal documents which may be used for agent operations.

6. We received valuable data on Cuban trade from the debriefing of a former official of the Ministry of Commerce who defected in Canada ^{were informed in} at the end of March. We ~~had been~~ ^{had been} informed in February by CIA sources that this official was disaffected and wished to work against Castro. We contacted him and attempted unsuccessfully to induce him to return to Cuba as our agent. We have since expedited his travel to Miami where he is being interrogated.

7. We are in contact with [redacted] Huber Matos, former associate of Fidel Castro, who broke with Fidel and has been in jail on the Isle of Pines since 1960. Although there is no practical method of effecting the escape or release of Huber at present, we will continue contact with [redacted] who maintains correspondence with Huber through [redacted] who are in Cuba.

CAC INFORMATION REPORTS

Following are highlights from selected interrogations of Cuban refugees processed through the Caribbean Admission Center (CAC) at

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Opa-locka, Florida. This information is secured entirely from untrained observers and is presented partly as original unconfirmed data and partly as a supplement to intelligence already received from controlled reliable sources. All CAC information is screened for use in the daily and weekly Cuban summaries. During the past week [redacted] 1309

(were present)
Cuban refugees through Miami, prepared 263 preliminary interrogation
(were prepared)

reports and disseminated 135 information reports.

8. Numerous reports confirm that all towns have been partitioned into "blocks" infiltrated by communist informants under the direction of block chiefs of the "Comite de Defensa." The informant system ^{is} *(also)* utilizes *(data)* data procured from the telephone monitoring switchboards established in the telephone centrals of every town. One refugee from the Cuban Telephone Company described a switchboard panel in the "Principe plant" in Havana which was monitoring "20 or 30 positions." These informants, their chiefs, members of the militia, G-2, "chivatos" (provocation agents), and other Castro supporters are now generally labeled by the populace as communists rather than Castroists.

9. While the network of informants protects the home front, officials of the National Directorate of the Integrated Revolutionary Organization (ORI) are increasingly occupied with the export of Castroist-communism to the Western Hemisphere. Flight manifests of Cubana Airlines show that hundreds of Latin Americans are being brought to

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Cuba for training and indoctrination." In addition to regular commercial transportation, charter flights to service these persons are being run thrice monthly throughout South America. In order to avoid Cuban visas and entry-exit stamps in their passports, these persons are given visas on a separate sheet of paper. In Cuba all arrangements are made for them by the Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos (ICAP).

10. Soviet military equipment has been reported in increasingly larger quantities and wider disbursement. One refugee said that he saw '20 or 25 wheel-mounted Soviet 100 mm field guns M-55 (identified from photographs) at a militia camp at Miranda near Camaguey.

11. Shortages of certain essential food items have resulted in widespread protests and, in a few instances, to open action by those directly affected. A group of "13 to 15 women" reportedly waylaid a milk truck, overpowered the driver, and each carried off two liters of milk.

12. Refugees described the existence of three resistance organizations, allegedly widespread in membership but limited in action. One, the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionario Militar (MRRM) is a group which has broken away from the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionario (MRR). Reportedly, its objective is to apprehend key Castro leaders "when the time is appropriate." MRRM is organized in all provinces except Matanzas and Camaguey where the movement has

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now begun to develop a following. The second organization, the Movimiento Democratico Cristiano (MDC), is described as oriented along traditional Christian democratic lines. It is said to have a "national coordinator, a national executive, provincial, military and political coordinators, and resistance chiefs." They claim that military and counter-revolutionary activities have been limited because of lack of equipment. A third organization, the Unidad Revolucionario (UR), is reported to be carrying out the sabotage of sugar fields by burning, using a small incendiary device made of gelatin, match heads, potassium permanganate tablets, and glycerine.

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